Corruption Doesn’t Start at the Bottom

The 20–60–20 rule is a behavioral heuristic widely used in ethics, fraud prevention, and organizational behavior literature. While not attributed to a single originator, it is supported by extensive empirical work on ethical decision-making and moral influence in organizations (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Mega public infrastructure projects are critical to economic development and public welfare, yet they frequently suffer from ethical failures that compromise quality, safety, and institutional credibility.

This article applies the 20–60–20 behavioral ethics rule to public infrastructure governance, arguing that ethical drift in mega projects is primarily driven by leadership influence over the ethically malleable majority. Through a structured analysis of leadership signaling, selective enforcement, and consultant pressure, the paper demonstrates how unethical behavior becomes normalized within project ecosystems.

The study concludes that ethical failure at the top exerts a disproportionate impact on governance outcomes, making leadership accountability central to infrastructure integrity.

1. Introduction

Mega infrastructure projects—particularly highways and expressways represent large-scale public investment and complex governance arrangements involving government authorities, consultants, and contractors.

Despite detailed contractual frameworks and technical specifications, such projects often experience quality dilution, cost inefficiencies, and post-completion failures.

Traditional explanations for these failures frequently focus on lower-level corruption or weak enforcement.

However, such perspectives overlook the systemic role of leadership behavior.

This article argues that ethical degradation in mega projects is best understood through the 20–60–20 rule, which highlights the decisive role of leadership in shaping the conduct of the majority within organizations.

2. The 20–60–20 Rule in Governance Context

The 20–60–20 rule posits that within any institutional system:

20% of actors remain ethical regardless of pressure

60% are ethically flexible and strongly influenced by leadership cues and institutional norms

20% consistently pursue unethical behavior for personal

In public infrastructure governance, this 60% includes Project Directors , Team Leaders, field engineers, inspectors, junior officers, and consultant staff whose decisions cumulatively determine project outcomes.

Leadership behavior thus becomes the primary determinant of whether this group aligns with integrity or ethical compromise.

3. Mechanisms of Ethical Drift in Mega Projects

3.1 Leadership Signaling

Ethical drift often begins with subtle, informal signals from top leadership. Statements such as:

Don’t create hurdles in national importance projects

Be practical, not bookish

The contractor is under pressure—help him

These signals appear administratively neutral but implicitly communicate tolerance for deviations.

These signals reduce moral clarity without issuing explicit illegal instructions, thereby insulating leadership while influencing behavior downstream.

3.2 Selective Enforcement of Rules

Selective enforcement further accelerates ethical drift:

Minor deviations by favored contractors are ignored

Identical deviations by others are penalized

Consultant objections are overridden verbally

This inconsistency teaches the 60% that rules are discretionary rather than normative.

Over time, compliance becomes conditional on power dynamics rather than contractual obligation.

3.3 Pressure on Consultants and Supervisory Agencies

Project Management Consultants (PMCs), intended as independent quality safeguards, are particularly vulnerable.

Informal directives may require them to:

Pass substandard work Modify inspection reports Delay or suppress defect reporting

Resistance often results in payment delays, threats of termination, or replacement of key personnel.

Consequently, consultant staff engage in self-censorship to protect institutional survival, further weakening oversight.

3.4 Normalization of Unethical Practices

As deviations persist without consequence, unethical practices become normalized, including:

Acceptance of reduced pavement thickness Overlooking inadequate compaction Inflated measurement quantities Back-dated approvals

At this stage, ethical compromise is no longer perceived as exceptional but as routine project management practice.

The influenceable 60% gradually aligns with the unethical 20%, not out of intent but adaptation.

4. Distribution of Benefits and Losses

4.1 Beneficiaries

Contractors benefit through reduced costs, faster execution, and enhanced margins.

Unethical leadership elements gain influence, informal control, and potential personal advantage, including future positioning.

4.2 Losers

The costs are borne by:

The public, through unsafe and low-durability infrastructure Ethical officers, who face marginalization or transfers Institutions, whose credibility and legitimacy erode The exchequer, through increased long-term maintenance expenditure

5. Why Infra Projects Are Especially Vulnerable

Mega infrastructure projects are uniquely susceptible to ethical drift because:

Structural defects often emerge after the defect liability period Quality failures are expensive to rectify retroactively Public safety risks are significant and long-term Accountability frequently shifts downward to field-level staff rather than decision-makers

These characteristics allow unethical decisions at early stages to remain concealed until remediation is no longer feasible.

6. Core Ethical Insight

When top leadership behaves unethically, the 60% does not become unethical by choice—but by survival.

This is why ethical failure at the top is far more damaging than corruption at the bottom.

This insight underscores a critical governance principle: ethical failure at the top is far more damaging than corruption at the bottom, because it reshapes norms, expectations, and institutional behavior across the system.

7. Conclusion

Ethical integrity in public infrastructure governance cannot be sustained through rules and audits alone.

Mega projects magnify leadership influence, making ethical clarity at the top a non-negotiable requirement.

The 20–60–20 rule demonstrates that governance outcomes are determined less by written procedures and more by consistent leadership conduct.

Reforming public infrastructure governance therefore demands a strategic shift from punitive focus on lower-level actors to systemic accountability of leadership, where ethical signaling, enforcement consistency, and protection of independent oversight are institutionally guaranteed.

Ethical culture is not built by policies alone, but by accountability and everyday Good Governance

References

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